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A Most Certain Tragedy, but Reason
Enough to Side-Step the Constitution and
Values of the United States?
David R. Chludzinski*
I. Introduction
Twenty-five years ago, in the midst of a bloody Cold War that
pitted communism against democracy, two East German citizens
hijacked a Polish airliner at gunpoint and diverted it to the sector of West
Berlin, then occupied and operated by the United States.' These East
Germans were eventually captured by the U.S. and held as detainees in a
military area also occupied and operated by the U.S. 2 Although these
East Germans violated the law by hijacking an airliner at gunpoint,3 the
United States Court for Berlin held, in United States v. Tiede,4 that the
U.S. Constitution gave these detainees the right to speak with counsel
and the right to a trial by jury.5
Twenty-five years after the court's decision in Tiede, foreign
nationals once again hijacked an airline. But this time, instead of
diverting the plane into a section of West Berlin, the hijackers diverted
the plane into sections of The World Trade Center in New York City on
September 11, 2001 (hereinafter "9/11"). Like the U.S. reaction to the
East German hijacking in the late 1970's, the U.S. military again sought
* J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law,
2005; B.A., Political Science, Boston College, 2001. The author wishes to thank Prof.
Stephanie Farrior for her thoughtful suggestions for this Comment. In addition, the
author wishes to thank Peter Burchett and Carolyn Pugh for their assistance in editing this
Comment.
1. See United States v. Tiede, Crim. Case No.78-001A, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. for
Berlin Mar. 14, 1979), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 179, 188 (1980); HERBERT J. STERN,
JUDGMENT IN BERLIN, 8 (Universe Books) (1984). Judge Stem gave his perspective on
the background outcome of United States v. Tiede, in particular, his decision to afford
United States constitutional rights to aliens of the United States. Id.
2. See STERN, supra note 1, at 27-28.
3. Id. at 18.
4. Tiede, 19 I.L.M. at 204.
5. Id. at 179.
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to prosecute those having political and social connections with the 9/11
hijacking by detaining suspects and placing them in a U.S. occupied and
operated military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. However, unlike the
East German detainees, these new Guantanamo Bay detainees are being
denied the right to counsel, trial by jury, and even the right to be heard in
U.S. Federal Court.
Without question, the 9/11 terrorist attacks created a sense of
caution and fear in many people throughout the world.6 These tragic
events made many Americans fear that, at any moment, terror from afar
could strike at home; a fear unmatched since the Japanese attacked Pearl
Harbor.7 But while both the government and citizens of the U.S. are
trying to cope with the aftermath of 9/11, so too are many non-resident
aliens, who fear being plucked from parts of the Middle East and
elsewhere to be brought to the U.S. military base in Guantanamo Bay as
suspects of terror.
A majority of these aliens brought to Guantanamo Bay have not
been charged with an offense, told why they are being held, or given the
opportunity to speak with counsel, family, or friends. 9 In March of 2003,
6. Andrew Miga, Attack on America; Violent Attacks Unite Congress-Vow To
Stand Behind Bush for Justice, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 13, 2001, at 22, available at 2001
WL 3810955. Discussing how the terrorist attacks of September 11 initially united many
American leaders against terrorists, especially politicians from both parties, who sought
retribution for the actions of the "terrorists." Id.
7. Commentary: Of Being Muslim and Arab-American Singled Out; Easy Targets
for Retaliation Because of Their Appearances, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 17, 2001, at 17, available
at 2001 WL 4115711. This article briefly describes the attacks of September 11, 2001,
and makes a comparison to the Attacks on Pearl Harbor over fifty years ago. Id. The
article further elaborates on the possible issue of resentment towards people of Arab
decent following September 11, and the need to restrain from retaliating against Arab-
Americans. Id.
8. John Mintz, Lawyer: Most Cuba Detainees Not Terrorists; Young Men Moved by
Arabic TV, 'Religious Fervor' Into Trip To Afghanistan, He Says, WASH. POST, June 2,
2002, at A 1l, available at 2002 WL 21748744. One of the lawyers representing many of
the detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba says that "[m]ost detainees at the U.S. prison in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have no affiliation with Al Qaeda or the Taliban and are largely
young Arab men who rushed to Afghanistan with visions of assisting the needy." Id.
Another attorney who represents some of the detainees, Najeeb AI-Nauimi said,
"Inflamed by televised images of deprivation, the men now detained left jobs and
families to go to Afghanistan... [o]nce in Afghanistan, the great majority never touched
a gun or got anywhere near Osama Bin Laden's training camps." Id.
9. Foreign Detainees Matter Too, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2002, at A24, available at
2002 WL 24828225. This article comments on the U.S. District Judge, Colleen Kollar-
Kotelly's dismissal of a lawsuit by twelve detainees being held in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. Id. The judge ruled that the United States Constitution does not apply to these
detainees because they are non-citizens being held outside of the United States. Id.
Therefore, the judge wrote that "no U.S. court has jurisdiction to consider the detainees'
claims that they are being illegally held without charge and without access to counsel and
to their families." Id.
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the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia permitted the
United States' actions by holding that courts are not open to aliens who
are being held in military custody outside of a United States' territory.10
In essence, the court determined that the protections of the U.S.
Constitution do not apply to these people, who are being held by the
United States military in an area occupied and operated by the United
States. "
In November of 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Al Odah v. United States'2 to determine whether United States federal
courts have jurisdiction to hear challenges to the open-ended detentions
of foreign nationals detained in Guantanamo Bay.' 3  If the Supreme
Court decides that the detainees can be heard in a federal court, the case
will be remanded to the district court and decided on its merits.
14
However, the Supreme Court has deferred addressing the issue of
whether these detentions are unconstitutional.15
Although Guantanamo Bay detainees will not know whether they
can challenge their detentions until the Supreme Court decides Al Odah
v. United States, they may seek comfort in a recent decision by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit held that the U.S.
cannot indefinitely detain captured foreigners in Guantanamo Bay
without allowing them to challenge their detentions in U.S. federal
10. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003)petition for cert.
filed, 72 USLW 3171 (Sept. 02, 2003) (NO. 03-334). This case involves twelve Kuwaiti
nationals who were allegedly providing humanitarian aid in Pakistan and Afghanistan
when they were seized by local bounty hunters, turned over to United States' forces, and
transferred to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Id. at 1136. None of the attorneys for the
plaintiffs in this case has had the opportunity to speak with their clients. Id.
11. Steve Vogel, Afghan Prisoners Going to Gray Area; Military Unsure What
Follows Transfer To U.S. Base in Cuba, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2002, at Al, available at
2002 WL 2519780. This article briefly describes how Guantanamo Bay, Cuba became
controlled and occupied by the United States. Id. After the Spanish-American War,
"Cuba gave control of the base to the United States.. . [t]he base was later leased in
perpetuity to the United States, an agreement that can only be revoked if both countries
agree. Id.
12. Linda Greenhouse, Justices To Hear Detainees; Top Court Takes Guantanamo
Prisoners' Case, INT'L. HERALD TRIB., Nov. 12, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WL
64831785. This article states that the Supreme Court will resolve whether or not federal
courts can hear this case, but will not yet determine whether the detentions are
constitutional. Id.
13. Charles Lane, Justices To Rule on Detainees' Rights; Court Access for 660
Prisoners At Issue, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2003, at Al, available at 2003 WL 67885366.
This article gives possible reasons why the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Al Odah
v. United States. Id. The article further suggests that the United States reputation is at
stake as a "beacon of liberty." Id. The article also questions whether Guantanamo Bay
can be truly considered a Cuban territory. Id.
14. See Greenhouse, supra note 12, at 1.
15. Id.
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courts, or provide them with legal counsel in order to do so. 16  This
decision may devastate those who support the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia's decision, and add a new wrinkle of
reasoning that might persuade the Supreme Court to reverse the Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in Al Odah and provide the detainees with
constitutional protections.
This comment will analyze why the situations in Tiede and the
situation in Guantanamo Bay came to quite different conclusions. It will
also question why the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia's approach of following the Supreme Court case of Johnson v.
Eisentrager is flawed. Parts II and III will explore the historical
backgrounds of the Al Odah and Tiede cases in order to better understand
their similarities. Part IV will discuss the Eisentrager decision and
demonstrate how AI Odah can be distinguished from Eisentrager. Part V
will examine the status of the U.S. in both West Berlin during the late
1970's, as well as present-day Guantanamo Bay, focusing specifically on
issues of sovereignty and territoriality. Part V will also explore the
similarities between Tiede and Al Odah, showing that Judge Stem's'
7
reasoning should be viewed favorably by the Supreme Court in Al Odah.
Part VI will explore the principle of mutuality of obligation, and discuss
whether a duty to allow constitutional protections is owed to the
detainees. Finally, Part VII will conclude this comment and suggest an
outcome for the Al Odah case.
II. Historical Background of United States v. Tiede
A. The Occupation of Germany
To better understand the jurisdictional issue in Tiede, a brief history
of the West Berlin occupation is needed. This history can be broken
down into two parts, the occupation of Germany and the United States'
judicial authority under the occupation.18
16. Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003); Henry Weinstein, The Nation;
Court Backs Rights for Detainees; The Foreigners Held At the U.S. Naval Base in Cuba
Can Legally Challenge Their Confinement, Appellate Judges Rule, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19,
2003, at A42, available at 2003 WL 68905685. This article states that the decision made
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to allow detainees access to United States
courts, although the effect of its decision has been stayed until the Supreme Court rules
later this summer, demonstrates that the judicial system will not allow the Executive
Branches power to go unchecked. Id.
17. Judge Stern was appointed by the United States Ambassador to the Federal
Republic of Germany to be the judge for the United States Court for Berlin in the case of
United States v. Tiede. 19 I.L.M. at 179. Judge Stem was, at the time of his appointment,
a judge for the federal district of New Jersey. Id.
18. Tiede, 19 I.L.M. at 181-88. Judge Stem explained the way that the occupying
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1. The occupation of Berlin
As World War II (hereinafter "WWII") neared its end in June of
1945, the Allied powers "assumed supreme authority over the country,
including all the powers possessed by the German Government... or
authority."' 9 It is important to note that the Allies expressly denied any
intent to "effect the annexation of Germany. '2 0  Although the U.S.
occupied only part of Germany following WWII, by deciding not to
annex the country, the U.S. did not intend to act as a sovereign over
Germany.21 This is because one of the most important objectives of the
Allied Powers was the reunification of Germany. To an extent, the
reunification of Germany was partially realized in May of 1955, when
the Bonn Conventions23 were signed and the occupation in the Federal
Republic of Germany was terminated.24 Regardless of the Bonn
Conventions, the Allied powers continued to occupy Berlin.
25
By 1945, the Berlin area was already occupied by the United States,
the British, the French, and the Soviet Union for over ten years.26 Berlin
had been split into sectors, each occupied by one of the Allied powers.27
Eventually, the relationship between the Soviet Union and the Allied
powers deteriorated. 8 By 1949, there existed a virtual split between the
sectors of Berlin in the East, controlled by the Soviet Union, and those
sectors in the West, controlled by the other three Allied powers.29
powers broke up Germany in order to occupy certain territories at the close of World War
II ("WWIt"). Id. at 181-87. He also explained how the courts set-up by the United States
were to be used in West Berlin. Id. at 188.
19. Id. at 181.
20. Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of Supreme
Authority by the Allied Powers, Signed at Berlin, June 5, 1945, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY, 1944-1971, Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 12-13 (1971).
21. Tiede, 19 I.L.M. at 182.
22. See Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference, August 1,
1945, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY, 1944-1971, Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 32,34 (1971).
23. Tiede, 19 I.L.M. at 182. These were a series of agreements signed by the three
Allied Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1952 that helped to formally end
the war between the countries and set up protocols for continued post-war success.
24. Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of
Germany, May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4251; Convention on the Settlement of Matters
Arising Out of the War and the Occupation, May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4411; Protocol to
Correct Certain Textual Errors in the Convention on Relations, June 27, 1952, 6 U.S.T.
5381.
25. Tiede, 19 I.L.M. at 183.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.; Agreement on the Terms for Continuance of the Allied (Western)
Kommandatura as the Agency for Allied Control of Berlin, June 7, 1949, reprinted in
20041
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2. The United States' judicial authority during the occupation
From the very beginning of the allied occupation of Germany, and
regardless that the U.S. military would provide governance within the
United States' Sector of Berlin, German law was applied to the courts.
30
However, the U.S. military continued to retain broad powers over the
German court system throughout the early 1940's. 3 By 1949, just as the
three Allied powers were diminishing their governance over Germany,
the United States occupation of the court system was doing the same.32
In fact, the jurisdiction of the occupation courts was reserved for those
few offenses described in the Occupation Statute of 1949.33 These
powers were finally discontinued with the signing of the Bonn
Conventions in 1955.34
However, before the Bonn Conventions concluded the functions of
the United States courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany,
the United States Court for Berlin was established.35 Although this Court
was established in 1955, until the Tiede case, it had only existed on
paper.36 In addition, although the court adopted Rules of Criminal
Procedure that were consistent with the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and Evidence, the court did not provide jury trials.37
B. Hijacking to Freedom?
In August 1978, three East Germans, Hans Detlef Alexander Tiede
("Tiede"), Ingrid Ruske ("Ruske"), and Ruske's daughter, Sabine, after
several attempts to escape Communist East Berlin, finally arrived in the
United States' Sector of West Berlin. 38  They arrived via a Polish
DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY, 1944-1971, Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 159 (1971). Although the new agreement adopted
by the three Allied powers provided Greater Berlin with full legislative, executive, and
judicial powers, it continued to reserve certain powers to the Allied Forces, including the
right to assume complete authority where "essential to security or to preserve democratic
government, or in the pursuance of the international obligations of their Governments."
Id. In addition, from the signing of the Bonn Conventions in 1955, up through the early
1970's, the local Berlin government, and not the Allied powers, continued to possess
complete authority over Berlin, except in the case of the above-mentioned exceptions. Id.
30. Proc. No. 2, United States Area of Control, United States Military Government
for Germany, Sept. 19, 1945, 12 Fed. Reg. 6997 (1947).
31. Tiede, 19 I.L.M. at 186.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 187.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 188.
38. See STERN, supra note 1, at 3.
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airliner, diverted from its planned destination of East Germany.39
This diversion was not accidental. 40 Tiede and Ruske, determined
to find freedom, hijacked LOT No. 16541 at gunpoint and forced the pilot
to land in West Berlin. 2 When the plane arrived at Tempelhof Airport,
then controlled by the United States, military personnel welcomed them
to free Berlin.43 Although Tiede, Ruske, and Sabine had arrived safely in
West Berlin, they would soon learn that their freedom was in much more
jeopardy than they had thought.44
What Tiede and Ruske found was that, although West Berlin was
occupied and controlled by the United States, the constitutional
protections Americans were usually provided were not so easily granted
to non-resident aliens, even if they were being held captive by United
States' forces.
After LOT 165 landed, Tiede, Ruske, and Sabine were arrested by
the United States military.45 Both Tiede and Ruske were questioned,
taken into custody, held without bail, and not provided the opportunity to
speak with legal counsel. However, throughout that time, they were not
charged with a crime.46 This treatment continued for months, 7 when
finally, after more than three months of being held without justification,
a formal arrest was finally made on Tiede and he was given an
attorney. 8
After Judge Stem was sworn in as the judge for the United States
Court for Berlin, the issue to be decided was whether or not the United
States' Constitution applied to the East German detainees, thus allowing
Tiede a jury trial.49 With strong opposition by the prosecution, Judge
Stern, after discussing the United States' role in West Berlin, held that
the United States Constitution would apply to these proceedings.50
39. Id.
40. Tiede, 19 I.L.M. at 179.
41. LOT No. 165 refers to the type of plane that was hijacked by Tiede and Ruske.
42. See STERN, supra note 1, at 4.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 27. This account may sound rather dramatic, but throughout the Cold War
Era, many people who were trapped in Communist controlled areas would do almost
anything to leap over the Berlin Wall and land in a free world. Id. at 24. Stern described
some of the daring escapes that occurred within weeks of the East Berlin border being
sealed off by the Russian forces with the construction of the Berlin Wall. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 27-28. Judge Stern discussed how the United States held the three captives
incommunicado, trying to avoid providing them with counsel, and avoiding charging the
three with any crimes because the United States was unsure of what the proper procedure
should be under the occupation authority. Id.
48. Id. at 48.
49. United States v. Tiede, 19 I.L.M. 179, 188 (1980).
50. Id. at 204.
20041
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Therefore, the East German detainees would be given the right to a jury
trial.51
III. Background of Al Odah v. United States
In response to the attacks of 9/11, American troops rounded up
people located in various parts of the Middle East whom the troops
suspected of misconduct, and detained them at the U.S. Naval Base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 2 On account of these detainments, some of the
captives have filed suit in United States federal courts. 3 Most notably,
twelve of the detainees, who are Kuwaiti nationals, claim a denial of
their Fifth Amendment right of due process and want the U.S. to either
charge them with a crime or allow them to go free.54 In addition, these
detainees allege to have been merely assisting in charitable efforts in the
region when they were taken captive.55
The district court in Al Odah dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed the district court's decision.56 This decision was
argued before the Supreme Court in March of 2004, and a final decision
is expected in the summer of 2004.57 Although both the district and
appellate courts' opinions discussed case law, interpreted the lease of
Guantanamo Bay, and determined that the Constitution does not apply to
the Guantanamo Bay detainees, as will be shown, and in light of Tiede
51. Id. at 188-203. Judge Stem spoke at length about the unique situation presented
in terms of the occupation of Germany and the role of The United States Court for Berlin.
Id. at 188. In addition, Stem explained that the West Berlin of 1979 is much different
than it was when it was first occupied by the Allied powers. Id. at 193. He notes that,
"West Berlin is a thriving metropolis, a center of commerce, tourism and the arts, with a
civilian administration adhering to the principles of democratic self-government, and
with a minimum of control exerted by the Western occupying powers." Id. Stem goes
on to say that the main reason that the Western powers remain is to protect the freedom
of West Berlin, and continue the goal of a "reunified, democratic Germany." Id. at 194.
By concluding that the constitutional right to a jury applies to the defendant aliens in this
case, Stem noted that the language in both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the
Constitution contains universal language that may include all people, not just American
citizens. Id. at 203; see also STERN, supra note 11, at 120-132.
52. See Mintz, supra note 8, at A11.
53. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1137, 1145. In making its decision, the court looked at a few different
criteria. First, the court looked at Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950), in
which the Supreme Court rejected the defense's proposition "that the Fifth Amendment
confers rights upon all persons, whatever their nationality, wherever they are located and
whatever their offenses." Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1140. In addition, the Al Odah court
found that the lease of Guantanamo Bay between the United States and Cuba continues to
make Cuba the overall sovereign. Id. at 1142.
57. See, supra notes 9, 10.
[Vol. 23:1
A MOST CERTAIN TRAGEDY
and the spirit and breadth of the Constitution, the Supreme Court should
strongly consider reversing the lower court's decision.
58
IV. The Supreme Court Should Decline To Follow the Reasoning of
Eisentrager59 Because Al Odah Can Be Easily Distinguished
One case that was cited numerous times in the Al Odah decision
was Johnson v. Eisentrager. Eisentrager has been viewed as settling the
issue that was in dispute in Al Odah.60 However, for many reasons, this
1950 case is very different than the Al Odah case, and should not be
followed.
The detainees in Eisentrager were in the service of the German
armed forces during WWII. 61 After Germany surrendered in May of
1945, all forces under German control were to surrender and discontinue
their war effort. 62  However, these twenty-one German nationals
continued to provide military aid to Japan and because of this aggression
against the U.S., when captured, they were charged, tried, and convicted
by U.S. military tribunals in China.63
These German detainees filed habeas corpus petitions and the U.S.
Supreme Court found, for multiple reasons, that U.S. federal courts did
not have jurisdiction to grant these petitions on behalf of the detainees.
64
Tone of these reasons, which can be and are distinguishable in the Al
Odah case is the fact that the detainees in Eisentrager had been given
military trials and had been convicted before they brought forth petitions
for habeas corpus. 5  Therefore, unlike Al Odah, the detainees in
Eisentrager had been previously charged and convicted of criminal
activity. Also, the Eisentrager detainees were caught in the process of
engaging in hostile operations against the U.S. 6 6 Finally, it was clear in
Eisentrager that the U.S. had neither territorial jurisdiction nor
58. See Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power To Determine the Status and Rights of
Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 519 n.67 (2003). Here Paust
opines that the Al Odah decision was wrongly decided. Id. Paust looks at the Tiede
decision as well as the habeas statute and determines that it "does not require sovereignty,
but only U.S. jurisdiction." Id.
59. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950). This case dealing with the
rights of enemy alien's captured in non-American controlled or occupied areas has been
used for the last fifty years as precedent for denying U.S. constitutional rights.
60. High Court to Hear Case of Detainees Held at Base; Guantanamo Decision
Could Shed Light on Future of Bush's Anti-Terror Policies, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 11,
2003, at Al, available at 2003 WL 3656363.
61. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 766.
64. Id. at 790-91.
65. Id. at 766.
66. Id.
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sovereignty over the locations the detainees were captured, prosecuted,
and confined in.
67
A. The Court's Decision in Eisentrager Should Not Be Extended to Al
Odah Because of the Factual Differences Between the Detainees
In Al Odah, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia used the decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager as a guide to deny
constitutional protections to the detainees. 68  That court's use of
Eisentrager should be questioned and not control the Supreme Court in
Al Odah because of the vast factual differences between the two cases.
Specifically, the Eisentrager decision should not control the Court in Al
Odah because there are three main differences between the detainees'
69alien status in the two cases.
1. The detainees in Eisentrager were already tried and convicted
for war crimes
The detainees in Eisentrager were already tried and convicted for
war crimes by military commissions prior to filing for writs of habeas
corpus.70 Therefore, these detainees had already been provided with due
process in the form of a military trial.71  Although the Court in
Eisentrager decided not to extend constitutional protections to the
detainees, the aliens were clearly given due process, by way of a trial,
and they were subsequently charged with crimes of war.72
By contrast, although the detainees in Al Odah have not been
convicted of any crime, they have been imprisoned for nearly two years,
have not been given legal process, and have not been given a reason for
their detainment.73  The detainees in Al Odah, under the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, should either be charged for a
crime that they committed, or released.
2. The alien status of the detainees
The second difference between the two groups of detainees relates
to their alien status. The detainees in Eisentrager were convicted war
criminals who had been assisting Japan as it was in the midst of a
67. Id. at 778.
68. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1142-43 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
69. See id.; Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765-67. These portions of the two opinions lay
out the facts in the cases and the factual differences are extremely obvious.
70. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 766.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1136.
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declared war with the United States.74 These detainees were non-resident
aliens whose actions most certainly made them enemies of the United
States. On the other hand, the detainees being held in Guantanamo Bay
are citizens of Kuwait, a country that is in no way at war or engaged in
hostilities with the United States.75 In fact, the detainees are citizens of a
United States ally.
76
In addition, the detainees in Al Odah have alleged that while they
were providing humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, they were seized by
villagers seeking bounties and handed over to United States forces.77
The Al Odah detainees should not be classified as alien enemies when
looking at how the Supreme Court classified alien enemies in the
Eisentrager decision, therefore, the detainees in Al Odah should not be
subjected to the constitutional restrictions that were laid out by the Court
in Eisentrager.78  These two distinctions should make Eisentrager
inapplicable to the situation in Al Odah.
3. There Exists Ambiguity As to Which Type of Control is
Needed in Order for the United States to Provide Constitutional
Protections to Non-Resident Aliens
The unique circumstances surrounding the involvement of the U.S.
in Guantanamo Bay are very different from those occurring in wartime
China and Germany during the 1950'S. 79 The Lease of 1903 states that
the United States is to have "complete jurisdiction and control" over
Guantanamo Bay.80 The U.S. has controlled and supervised this area for
over one hundred years.8' In contrast, China, where the Eisentrager
74. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 766.
75. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1136; Brief for Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2-3, Al
Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (2003) (No. 03-343), available at 2003 WL
22428940.
76. See Lane, supra note 13, at Al.
77. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1136; Brief for Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2-3, Al
Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (2003) (No. 03-343), available at 2003 WL
22428940.
78. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 771-77. In detail, the Court described the difference
between aliens who are nationals of countries who are at war with the United States and
those aliens who are not. Id. In addition, the Court stressed that those aliens who
"remained in the service of the enemy" would be given even less access to United States'
courts. Id. at 776.
79. Id. at 766. This case involved German nationals who petitioned the court for
writs of habeas corpus after being tried and convicted by a military commission in China,
a country over which the United States is most definitely not sovereign. Id.
80. Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, Feb. 23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S.
No. 418 [hereinafter 1903 Lease].
81. See id. Article III of the lease reads, "While on the one hand the United States
recognizes the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the
above described areas of land and water, on the other hand the Republic of Cuba consents
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detainees were tried, and Germany, where they were imprisoned, were
both independent countries, in no way under U.S. control. In addition,
because both China and Germany were independent countries, the United
States had no territorial reach over either of them.
The Court in Eisentrager repeatedly noted both the importance of
territorial jurisdiction, as well as sovereignty, when describing whether
the U.S. judiciary would have the power to act in a proceeding.82 This
fact compels one to question what the Supreme Court thought was
enough control to grant constitutional protections to non-resident aliens.
If sovereignty is what was expected, the Supreme Court in Eisentrager
should have spoken with more clarity.
The confusion between territorial control and sovereignty is
magnified by the fact that many believe Eisentrager stands for the
premise that aliens outside the territorial reach of the U.S. have no
constitutional rights. 83 If this statement is true, and territorial reach is the
important question, it appears that Eisentrager would not apply to the Al
Odah case because it is obvious that Guantanamo Bay is within the
territorial reach of the United States.84
Although the court in Al Odah tries to resolve the Supreme Court's
use of the terms "sovereignty" and "territorial jurisdiction," by reasoning
that they were used in different contexts to describe different things, the
fact remains that the United States' current position in Guantanamo Bay
is far different from its position in 1950's China and Germany.85 Further
that during the period of the occupation by the United States of said areas under the terms
of this agreement the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control over
and within said areas with the right to acquire ... for the public purposes of the United
States any land or other property therein by purchase or by exercise of eminent domain
with full compensation to the owners thereof." Id.; Gerald L. Neuman, Surveying Law
and Borders: Anomolous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1197, 1198 (1996). Neuman describes
Guantanamo Bay as "a self-sufficient and fully American enclave, larger than Manhattan,
with thousands of military and civilian residents who enjoy the trappings of a small
American city." See Neuman, supra note 65, at 1198. Neuman also notes that the
military base "operates its own schools, power system, water supply.., and [c]ongress
has repeatedly extended federal statutes to the base." See id.
82. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 771, 778.
83. Linda Greenhouse, Prisoners Ruling Coming, DESERET MORNING NEws, Nov. 11,
2003, at Al, available at 2003 WL 67514091. This article states some of the key issues
that need to be resolved by the Supreme Court when it decides Al Odah v. United States.
Id.
84. See Weinstein, supra note 16, at A42.
85. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Circuit Judge
Randolph reasoned that the Supreme Court attached separate significance to the terms
sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction. Id. at 1143. However, at least one scholar has
argued that the habeas corpus statute only requires United States jurisdiction, not
sovereignty. See Paust supra note 50, at 529 n.67. Even if sovereignty is the correct test
to determine constitutional rights abroad, the United States exercise of complete control
and jurisdiction over Guantanamo Bay is sovereign in nature and should be enough to
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proof that Guantanamo Bay is considered to be an American territory
comes from the official website of Guantanamo Bay.86 The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia should not have extended
Eisentrager based on the Courts' ambiguity as to what was needed,
sovereignty or territorial control.
B. A Broader and More Logical Reading of the Lease of 1903 Reveals
That Constitutional Protections Should Be Granted to the Detainees
in Al Odah
1. Lease construction and interpretation
As stated earlier, one of the difficulties the lower courts had in
extending constitutional protections to the Al Odah detainees was based
on the fact that the language of the lease of 1903 states that Cuba has
"ultimate sovereignty" over the territory known as Guantanamo Bay.87
The lower courts read the language of the one hundred year old lease
between Cuba and the U.S. narrowly, and used their reading as a major
basis to deny constitutional protections to the detainees.88 By reading the
lease narrowly, the courts construed the rule established by the Supreme
Court in Johnson v. Eisentrager to deny constitutional rights to the
detainees.89
However, a broader and more logical reading of the Lease may cast
doubt on the ruling in Al Odah. For instance, the language of the lease
between Cuba and the United States appears to contradict itself multiple
times.9° At first the lease purports to grant "ultimate sovereignty" to
Cuba, but later, it specifies that "the United States shall exercise
complete jurisdiction and control" over Guantanamo Bay.91 By granting
allow constitutional protections. See id.
86. Brief for Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d
1134 (2003) (No. 03-343), available at 2003 WL 22428940. This petition quotes the
official website where the United States Navy describes Guantanamo Bay as, "a Naval
reservation, which, for all practical purposes, is American territory. Under the [lease]
agreements, the United States has for approximately [one hundred] years exercised the
essential elements of sovereignty over this territory, without actually owning it." See
also The History of Guantanamo Bay: An Online Edition (1964), available at
http://www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/history.htm.
87. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1142.
88. Id. at 1142-44
89. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771, 778 (1950). Although the Court
appears to place a great deal of emphasis on the fact that the defendant aliens were never
in any territory over which the United States was sovereign, other sections of the opinion
appear to focus on the importance of the alien's presence within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States. Id. at 771.
90. See 1903 Lease, supra note 80.
91. See id.
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"ultimate sovereignty" to one country, it would logically follow that the
U.S. must retain some extent of sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay.92 If
the parties to the lease did not intend for the U.S. to have partial
sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay, then it would have been superfluous
to use the word "ultimate" when determining the said amount of
sovereignty.
2. Course of performance of the 1903 lease.
In addition to determining whether the U.S. retains partial
sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay, because a divorce of "ultimate
sovereignty" from "complete jurisdiction and control" exists, we must
also consider the amount of control that the U.S. has exerted over
Guantanamo Bay for the past one hundred years. 93 Thus, even if a
narrow reading of the lease is proper, the course of performance for the
1903 lease by the U.S. over the last one hundred years makes it difficult
to ignore the "complete jurisdiction and control" language in the actual
lease with Cuba.9 4 In fact, one scholar notes the grasp of American
power over Guantanamo Bay has similarities to an American City.95
Although the lower courts focused on the word "sovereignty," the fact
that the United States exercises sole power over Guantanamo Bay, as
well as the implied grant of "partial" sovereignty over the area, should
allow Guantanamo Bay to be treated as part of the United States for
jurisdictional purposes.96
V. The Court in Al Odah Should Follow Judge Stem's Opinion in
Tiede
Rather than following Eisentrager, the U.S. Supreme Court should
follow the United States Court for Berlin's decision in United States v.
Tiede in its approach to Al Odah.97 The Court should do so because the
Tiede and Al Odah cases are very similar. In both cases, the detainees
were foreign nationals of countries friendly to the United States, they
were held by the U.S. military, and, for a period of their imprisonment,
the detainees were neither charged for their alleged crimes nor permitted
92. See Paust, supra note 58, at 519 n.67.
93. See 1903 Lease, supra note 80.
94. See Neuman, supra note 81, at 1198.
95. See id.
96. See Vogel, supra note 11, at Al. This article quotes one of the briefs filed for
petitioners in AI Odah v. United States, telling the Court that the amount of control by the
United States in Guantanamo Bay is so great that it acts as if it were a part of the United
States. Id.
97. United States v. Tiede, 19 I.L.M. 179 (1980).
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to speak with counsel.98 However, the most important reason that the
Court should follow Tiede is the fact that the U.S. has greater control
over Guantanamo Bay now, than it had over West Berlin in 1979.
A. The United States Has More Control Over Guantanamo Bay Now
Than it Had Over West Berlin in 1979
Although the American Sector of West Berlin was within the
jurisdiction of the U.S., the fact remained that Germany retained
sovereignty over the entirety of West Berlin.99 Regardless of the lack of
sovereignty over West Berlin, Judge Stem still afforded the detained
aliens with the protections of the United States Constitution.'00 Although
the U.S. was using its occupying power to convene the court in Berlin,
Judge Stem appeared to agree with the defense's proposition that "the
defendants' rights could not be snuffed out merely by shuffling them out
of the German system of justice into an 'occupation court,' convened in
time of peace, to try an ordinary criminal case."1 °1
Similarly, the U.S. occupies Guantanamo Bay, having complete
jurisdiction and control over the area. 0 2  Also, as stated above, the
United States' authority in the area is widely recognized and
acknowledged. 10 3 The self-sufficiency that the U.S. has within the area
provides additional evidence that it controls the area.10 4 The mere fact
that Cuba retains ultimate sovereignty under the Lease agreement, just as
Germany retained sovereignty over West Berlin, should not be
determinative for denying constitutional protections to the detained
aliens.
In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recently
shed some light on the question of United States' sovereignty over
98. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also STERN,
supra note 11, at 28.
99. Tiede, 19 I.L.M. at 193. In particular, Judge Stem said that West Berlin in 1979
was minimally controlled by the United States. Id. Stem also explained that the
occupation authority, which the United States had over West Berlin, did not "displace the
sovereignty of the occupied state." Id. at 188. The explicit philosophy of the United
States was to "afford to the people of Berlin the fullest possible rights of self-government
through their own institutions." Id.
100. Id. at 204.
10 1. See STERN, supra note 1, at 107. The defense noted that, "Berlin is not an enemy
territory ... [and] [t]here is a functioning Berlin government, with a fully-developed
political and justice system which deals with the daily problems of a large metropolis."
Id.
102. See 1903 Lease, supra note 80.
103. Brief for Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d
1134 (2003) (No. 03-343), available at 2003 WL 22428940.
104. See Neuman, supra note 81, at 1197, 1198.
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Guantanamo Bay.10 5 In the opinion, Judge Reinhardt'0 6, after looking at
the Lease between the U.S. and Cuba, quoted Black's Law Dictionary's
definition of sovereignty. 10 7  This source defined sovereignty as "the
supreme, absolute and uncontrollable power by which any independent
state is governed." 10 8  When Judge Reinhardt looked at the actual
presence and control of the U.S. in Guantanamo Bay, he stated that "it
would appear that there is no stronger example of the United States'
exercise of supreme power than at Guantanamo."
t °0 9
Reinhardt also noted the exclusive control the United States has had
over Guantanamo Bay for the past one hundred years and opined that the
"ultimate sovereignty" language used in the 1903 lease was likely meant
to provide Cuba with a reversionary interest in Guantanamo Bay if the
U.S. gave up their position in Guantanamo Bay. I" 0 This, of course, has
not occurred. Therefore, the Supreme Court in Al Odah should follow
Judge Reinhardt's reasoning and view the U.S. as sovereign over
Guantanamo Bay.
B. Even if the Court is Unwilling to View Guantanamo Bay As
Sovereign U.S. Territory, an Alternative May Exist to Allow
Constitutional Protections to the Detainees in Al Odah
If sovereignty is found to be the controlling factor for affording
constitutional protections, and if the Court finds that the U.S. does not
retain sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay, it should still follow Judge
Stem's decision in Tiede. In Tiede, although the prosecution attempted
to show that only American citizens were entitled to constitutional
protections when outside of the U.S., Judge Stern sharply disagreed,"'
105. See Weinstein, supra note 16, at A42.
106. Judge Reinhardt is a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and it
is he who wrote the opinion in Gherebi v. Bush, which held that the detainees have the
right to bring habeas corpus petitions in front of U.S. federal courts.
107. See, Weinstein, supra note 16, at A42
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003). In this recent decision by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the court held that the Guantanamo Bay detainees
are permitted to challenge their detentions in United States federal courts. Id. at 1305.
Judge Reinhardt focused on the language of the 1903 Lease with Cuba, the definition of
"sovereignty," and the jurisdiction and control, which the United States exerts and has
exerted over Guantanamo Bay. Id. at 1297. Reinhardt concluded that by using a plain
meaning interpretation of the words used in the 1903 Lease, and by looking at the
conduct of both the United States and Cuba since the lease was entered into, the United
States appears to exercise sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay at the present time. Id. at
1296. In fact, Reinhardt says that the United States will continue to exercise sovereignty
until the United States decides to leave Guantanamo Bay. Id at 1293.
111. United States v. Tiede, 19 I.L.M. 179, 203 (1980).
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stating that certain fundamental constitutional rights, as they are written,
should apply to all people, not just United States' citizens." 2
Stem examined certain amendments to the Constitution and stated
that, with no ambiguity, the Fifth Amendment says "no person shall be
deprived of life or liberty without due process of the law," and "the Sixth
Amendment protects all who are 'accused,' without justification."'" 3
Because these amendments were written so as to exclude no one, Stem
found that friendly aliens were meant to enjoy the same rights as
citizens. 114 It is important that Stem referred to the Fifth Amendment
specifically because it is the due process rights the detainees in Al Odah
feel are being violated by not being given access to the courts in order to
file writs of habeas corpus."l
5
Although Stem's statements discussing the universal application of
constitutional rights to friendly aliens appears to contradict portions of
the Eisentrager decision, a closer reading of Eisentrager shows that no
true disagreement exists." 6 The Court in Eisentrager repeatedly made
reference to only "non-resident alien enemies" when it decided not to
extend coverage of the Constitution, namely the Fifth Amendment, to the
detainees." 17 The Court in Eisentrager never spoke of the constitutional
protections that should be afforded to non-resident, friendly aliens.
Therefore the Court in Al Odah should not be made to follow the
Eisentrager decision because the Al Odah detainees should not be
considered "alien enemies.,' 1 18
The detainees in Al Odah cannot be considered alien enemies
because they are nationals of a country that is allied with the United
States." l9  In addition, the detainees were captured and brought to
Guantanamo Bay while allegedly involved in peace missions, and not
while involved in unlawful, hostile action, the kind of action the
Eisentrager Court viewed as important in determining the status of non-
resident aliens. 120
112. Id. at197.
113. Id. at 203.
114. Id.
115. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
116. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950). This portion of the decision
discusses reasons why alien enemies were not meant to be included within the
constitutional protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id.
117. Id. at 784.
118. Joan Fitzpatrick, Sovereignty, Territoriality, and The Rule of Law, 25 HASTINGS
INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 303, 328 (2002). Fitzpatrick discusses, among other things, the
definition of alien enemies, as set forth by Congress, and explains why that definition
may be too exclusive to encompass certain groups of aliens, namely those aliens that are
involved in terrorist groups such as Al Qeada. Id.
119. Al Odah, 321 F.3dat 1136.
120. Id.; Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 783.
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Furthermore, because the Eisentrager Court found importance in
the classification of non-resident aliens in determining whether
constitutional protections would be provided, we should look at the
definition of an alien enemy.12 1 As it is codified in 50 U.S.C. § 21, alien
enemies are defined as, "natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of [a]
hostile nation or government" with which the United States is engaged in
a declared war.i22
The detainees in Al Odah do not fall within this definition of alien
enemies for many reasons. First, even though the U.S. is currently
involved in a war on terror, this type of war is different than traditional
notions of war. 23 Therefore, the classification of the parties involved
must be different. 24 The detainees in Al Odah are nationals of Kuwait, a
country that is not in a declared war with the United States. 125  In
addition, even if the government would argue that the detainees were
members of Al Qaeda, a group of people whom the U.S. are actively
involved in hostilities with, it is very unlikely that members of a
fundamental terrorist group, like Al Qaeda, can be said to be citizens of a
nation or government.
126
It is unlikely that the detainees in Al Odah could be classified as
alien enemies under the definition codified by Congress. Therefore, the
Supreme Court should not follow the Eisentrager decision, even if the
Court concludes that Guantanamo Bay cannot be considered sovereign
territory of the United States. 27 Instead, the Court should follow the
reasoning of Judge Stem, who acknowledged that certain amendments to
the Constitution were meant to include both United States' citizens as
well as friendly aliens.
128
121. 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2003).
122. See id.; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 118, at 328 n.80.
123. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 118, at 328. The current war on terror is more of an
ideological war being waged by fundamentalist groups, and not actual countries, whose
armies would be considered citizens or "subjects of [a] hostile nation or government." Id.
at n. 80.
124. See 50 U.S.C. § 21; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 118, at 328.
125. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1136.
126. See 50 U.S.C. § 21; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 118, at 328 n.80.
127. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in The War on
Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 15 (2003). Among other constitutional issues,
Cole explains that the Enemy Alien Act continues to be good law in the United States,
and it "requires no individualized finding of culpability, dangerousness, or even
suspicion" by the United States when it is used. Id. However, Cole reiterates Fitzpatrick,
acknowledging that a "formally declared war" is a condition that must be met in order for
the Act to be used. Id.
128. United States v. Tiede. 19 I.L.M. 179, 203 (1980).
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VI. The Mutuality of Obligation Principle Should be Considered by the
Court When Deciding Al Odah
When deciding Al Odah, the Supreme Court should also consider
the notions of fairness and mutuality that Judge Stern focused on when
deciding Tiede.129 These values have been reiterated by both Supreme
Court Justices and legal scholars as logical and fair means of protecting
those aliens who are subject to certain U.S. laws or obligations. 30
In Tiede, the detainees were imprisoned by United States'
authorities, on a U.S. Air Force Base, without being formally arrested or
charged. 3 1 They were interviewed by German police on behalf of the
U.S., guarded by the U.S. military, and were not permitted to speak with
counsel for over three months. 32 Although the U.S. was immersed in
every aspect of the Tiede detainment, the government did not wish to
extend protections of the U.S. Constitution to the alien detainees. 33
However, in his bench opinion, Judge Stern disagreed with the
prosecution's argument. Stern spoke of American traditions of fairness
and justice stating that, "it is a first principle of American life, not only
life at home but life abroad, that everything its public officials do is
governed by, measured against, and authorized by the United States
Constitution.'
134
Judge Stern was proposing that an obligation to provide
constitutional rights is owed to those who are under the control of United
States' authorities, regardless of whether they are inside or outside of a
U.S. territory. Additionally, Stem said that without providing reciprocal,
constitutional rights, there is nothing, and "people could be dragged off
the streets [and] incarcerated." 135 This idea has been expanded upon by
129. Tiede, 19 I.L.M. at 191-92; see also STERN, supra note 1, at 123-24, 142.
130. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279-97 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS To THE CONSTITUTION; IMMIGRANTS,
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW, 60-100 (Princeton University Press)(1996).
Neuman's book focuses on the constitutional rights that currently exist for aliens, both
within the United States as well as those abroad. Id. at 52-117. Neuman examines the
framework of the United States' Constitution, as well as precedent Supreme Court cases,
in an attempt to solve current problems and tricky constitutional issues concerning non-
resident aliens. Id. at 97-117. Neuman also focuses one chapter on the principle of
mutuality of obligation, noting that uncertainties exist in applying constitutional rights to
aliens in extraterritorial situations; however, Neuman believes that those issues should be
decided in favor of extending constitutional protections in those cases where the United
States imposes certain obligations on non-resident aliens. Id.
131. See STERN, supra note 1, at 141-42.
132. Id.
133. Tiede, 19 I.L.M. at 179.
134. Id. at 192; See also STERN, supra note 1, at 124.
135. Tiede, 19 I.L.M. at 191; See also STERN, supra note 1, at 123-24.
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others, and has stood for the principle of mutuality of obligation. 136
In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, Justice Brennan wrote a
dissenting opinion that closely mirrored those ideas set forth by Judge
Stem in Tiede.137 Justice Brennan stated that when the U.S. government
investigates and attempts to hold non-resident aliens accountable under
U.S. law, the government has treated them as members of the U.S.
community, and is therefore obliged to respect certain fundamental
rights.'38  Justice Brennan also noted that by disregarding the
fundamental constitutional rights of non-resident aliens when the U.S. is
responsible for capturing and holding them, the nation's status as
"protector of liberties" becomes lost and it begs other countries to treat
United States' citizens in the same manner when they are captured or
held. 139
Although Justice Brennan's opinion was the minority view, he is
not the only one who agrees with the notion of mutuality and fairness
that Judge Stem set forth in Tiede. In his book, Strangers To The
Constitution140 , Gerald Neuman examined the geographical scope of the
Constitution and how it might be applied extraterritorially. Neuman
discussed the approach coined "mutuality of obligation," saying that the
"acquisition of sovereignty over a territory [is] sufficient to extend the
[Constitution] there."' 14 1 If the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's view that the definition of sovereignty
encompasses the type of control that the U.S. possesses in Guantanamo
Bay, then Stem's and Brennan's idea of mutuality of obligation, as
reiterated by Neuman, appears to be a strong argument for granting
constitutional protections to the detainees in Al Odah.
Additionally, Neuman states even more broadly that the mutuality
approach would entitle aliens, even those outside of a United States'
territory, to constitutional protections when "the United States asserts an
alien's obligation to comply with American law as a justification for
interfering with the alien's freedom or property."' 142 This example, which
follows along the same lines as Judge Stem's remarks in Tiede and
136. Tiede, 19 I.L.M. at 191.
137. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 284 (1990). This case denied
Fourth Amendment protection to a non-resident alien from illegal searches by United
States' officials done in defendant's residence in Mexico. Id. at 259. Justice Brennan
wrote a dissenting opinion in the case, stressing the importance of providing
constitutional rights to aliens when their rights are being imposed upon by the United
States. Id. at 284. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 285.
140. See NEUMAN, supra note 130, at 60-100.
141. Id. at 72-73.
142. Id. at 99.
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Justice Brennan's dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez, fits very closely with the
current situation in Al Odah and should be given deference by the
Supreme Court.
Although Neuman states that the mutuality of obligation approach
may not provide for all domestic constitutional rights to residents of
adversary nations during armed hostilities, as stated earlier, the detainees
in Al Odah are not residents of an adversary nation, and therefore this
cautionary warning does not apply. 143  In a quite literal sense, the
detainees in Al Odah were taken captive, handed over to United States'
authorities, and transferred to a land controlled by the U.S. 144 Then, the
detainees were questioned, held captive, and not permitted to speak with
legal counsel or their families for a period of over two years. 145
Although the U.S. has initiated all of these actions, the government is
attempting to deny the due process rights of the detainees, by arguing
that writs of habeas corpus cannot be filed in United States' federal
courts.
The Supreme Court should consider the mutuality of obligation
approach when deciding Al Odah because the government, by holding
and questioning the detainees, owes a duty to provide reciprocal rights.
The Supreme Court should also consider this approach because the
United States, which constantly stresses its values of fairness and
equality, should not appear to be hypocritical when dealing with non-
resident friendly aliens. 1
46
VII. Conclusion
For many reasons, it would be both improper and against United
States' policy for the Supreme Court to follow the Eisentrager decision
when it decides Al Odah. Instead, the Court should follow the Tiede
decision and provide the detainees with Fifth Amendment protections,
and allow them to file writs of habeas corpus to challenge their
detentions in United States' federal court.
The Court should not follow the Eisentrager decision because the
circumstances surrounding the detentions of the detained German
soldiers are distinguishable from the detentions of the Kuwaiti nationals
in Al Odah. At the present time, no military tribunal has been
commenced against the detainees in Al Odah, and they have not been
charged with any crime, whereas both of these circumstances had
143. Id. at 100.
144. Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d at 1134, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
145. Id.
146. See Cole, supra note 127, at 29.
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occurred when the Eisentrager detainees filed writs of habeas corpus.
141
Also, even though it was obvious that the detainees in Eisentrager were
German soldiers and that they were providing aid to Japan, a country that
was in the midst of a declared war with the United States, the same
cannot be said for the Kuwaiti nationals in Al Odah, who are not citizens
of any nation with which the United States is fighting a declared war.148
The Court should also decline to follow Eisentrager because the
United States has "complete jurisdiction and control" over Guantanamo
Bay, a type of control that the United States did not have over China or
Germany, the locations where the Eisentrager detainees were tried and
imprisoned.1 49 Finally, at least one court, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, has opined that the control the United States exerts over
Guantanamo Bay is one of the strongest examples of United States'
sovereignty.
1 50
Because the decision in Eisentrager turned heavily on both the fact
that the detainees were non-resident alien enemies who had already been
given a military trial, as well as the fact that the detainees were never
contained in lands the United States had control or sovereignty over, the
Supreme Court should not apply Eisentrager when it decides Al Odah.1 51
Instead, on account of both the factual similarities between the two
cases, as well as the United States' own principles of fairness and
mutuality that are stated in Tiede, the Court should follow Tiede when
deciding Al Odah. The detainees in Al Odah are nationals of a United
States ally and are not citizens of a nation involved in a declared war
with the United States. Therefore, they should not be considered alien
enemies, but instead should be classified as friendly aliens, just as the
detainees in Tiede.
Also, because the United States controls Guantanamo Bay to a
greater extent than the United States controlled West Berlin in 1979,
granting certain constitutional protections to the friendly aliens in Al
Odah would appear to comport with Tiede. In addition, the Supreme
Court should consider concepts of fairness and mutuality because, as has
been shown, a nation that prides itself in these virtues should not allow
its government to unilaterally detain friendly aliens without providing
them with reciprocal rights.
The Supreme Court faces a monumental task when it decides Al
Odah. This decision must be made with an eye towards fundamental
fairness, and it should be decided on the specific facts of the case.
147. Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1136; Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765-66 (1950).
148. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765-66.
149. See 1903 Lease, supra note 80; Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 766.
150. See Neuman, supra note 81, at 1198; see also Weinstein, supra note 16, at A42.
151. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778, 784.
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Because the United States is a nation which many others look towards
for guidance, the last thing the Supreme Court should do is allow the
United States government to detain massive amounts of non-resident
aliens in a place the government says is outside the reach of the United
States, thus allowing those detainments to continue unchallenged. The
Supreme Court should allow the detainees in Al Odah to challenge their
detention in United States federal court and thus show the world that the
United States is a nation that practices what it preaches.
15 2
152. See supra note 60, at Al; see also Cole, supra note 127, at 29. Cole
acknowledges that fighting a war for freedom does not really make sense when the
United States is in turn limiting the freedom of others. Id.
2004]

